Another year of Asean, another year of 'what's the point?'

Hello friends!

As my spin instructor put it last night, Jakarta should host Asean every week — the air pollution has all but disappeared. Which is to say, Jakarta did a fantastic job hosting even if the outcomes have done little to assuage the doomsayers.

These ‘end of Asean week’ wraps are the same every year, I worry. There’s little movement on anything and it turns into 1200 words of me becoming increasingly upset. Still, there are always a few very intriguing comments made by either leaders or the big brains and that’s what I’ve gotten into here today.

So let’s crack in!Erin Cook 

These are the three truths about Asean as I, an optimistic nerd, see it: Asean’s strength is in deepening and formalising economic integration over a region wildly economically diverse, Asean is hamstrung by political diversity of member states when it comes to conflict, and the world is a much better place for the bloc’s existence. 

The first point is certainly the most prominent in recent years and especially in Jakarta this week. It’s Deals! Deals! Deals! reports Nikkei Asia. At least 93 projects worth $38.2 billion were on the table at the Asean Indo-Pacific Forum, where public and private funders sniff about for opportunities across the region. 

But the two things I want to crack in on are the South China Sea and the crisis in Myanmar. Both are instances of the bloc being hamstrung AND evidence of the importance of Asean’s mere existence. 

In one of China’s more troll-like foreign policy moves in recent years, it released a new ‘standard map of China’ which featured its 9-Dash Line just a week before Asean kicked off a string of major multilateral meetings. Not a chance, Malaysia said as the first Southeast Asian country to object. The map’s South China Sea claims overlap with Malaysia’s legal claims to waters off East Malaysia. 

The Philippines, often the great chest-beater on the South China Sea, was slower to object but has since been swinging. While Philippine President Bongbong Marcos wore some criticism back home for referring to the waters as the South China Sea, rather than the preferred West Philippine Sea, I was somewhat impressed with his comments.

“The Philippines firmly rejects misleading narratives that frame the disputes in the South China Sea solely to the lens of strategic competition between two powerful countries. This not only denies us our independence, our agency, but it also disregards our own legitimate interests,” he said, as reported by the Inquirer. 

Here, here. Marcos’ presidency to date has been largely reported internationally as a ‘righting of the ship’ back towards the US (and away from China) and that has never really, fully tracked. He could almost be speaking for other claimants in the bloc, whose moves are seen similarly. Vietnam’s politburo can barely sneeze without it being evidence of a shift towards the US.

Sebastian Strangio flags an intriguing point in the Diplomat. Brunei, who usually says nothing at all, issued a statement last weekend slamming the new map. Brunei reaffirms its commitment “to the maintenance of peace, stability and security in the South China Sea” — but also its commitment to ‘bilaterally’ dealing with it all in line with UNCLOS while working towards the danged Code of Conduct.

Do we even need to mention the Code of Conduct? Let’s give Evan Laksmana the final word: “Even if the Code of Conduct is concluded by 2026 — a goal announced in July 2023 — it will not resolve any underlying disputes, as these must be negotiated based on the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and that will take years, if not decades.”

And then there’s Myanmar. Naypyidaw was stripped of its 2026 leadership, instead bringing up the Philippines’ hosting by a year. 

Don’t call that a win or a step towards neutralising the conflict, Euan Graham writes for the Strategist today. “This move to spare Asean’s blushes by alphabetically rearranging the diplomatic deckchairs will do nothing to convince critics that it is any closer to a more coherent policy position on Myanmar. Neither the Asean chairman’s statement nor the East Asia Summit statement included any new significant initiatives or wording on the matter,” Graham writes in the most succinct paragraph on the whole mess.

Still, the bloc managed to wind up the junta. “The views are not objective and decisions are bias and one-sided,” the military-run government said in a statement on Wednesday to Global New Light of Myanmar and reported by Al Jazeera. 

It is always a bit odd to read statements like this from the junta, slamming Asean for being so mean to them. Literally no one is happy with what Asean is doing, they’re getting off with a light touch! 

I don’t really know what to make of it, so let’s check in with the two smarties whose comments on this I always follow closely. 

Thitinan Pongsudhirak’s view, which is always very compelling, is damning in some ways, and uncharacteristically optimistic in others. While Thailand’s brand new prime minister, Srettha Thavisin, was too busy getting his new cabinet approved to make the trip to Jakarta, a shift in Thailand’s policy towards Myanmar is likely, as Thintinan sees it. The former Prayuth Chan-o-cha government had been way too open to the junta and had lent ‘legitimacy.’ Srettha, despite the bizarre coalition backing him, is unlikely to be quite so open. 

Intriguingly, he looks to Indonesia and Malaysia’s refusals to acknowledge Myanmar’s State Administration Council as the legitimate government of the country as a crucial bedrock to rebuilding Asean credibility on the issue. “If the Philippines and Thailand, both with democratically (elected) governments, can follow suit, Asean centrality will be given a big boost. Other Asean member states can come in as they see fit. But they should not be allowed to hold Asean hostage on the Myanmar impasse because the (Five Point Consensus) was signed by representatives from each of the 10 member states.” 

The other fella I always look to is, of course, Indonesia’s former foreign minister Marty Natalegawa. When he does not feel good about the way things are going, that’s a real sign of concern. “I get the sense that Asean is at a loss for ideas … one can speak with eloquence about one individual member state’s wish to happen in Myanmar. But first and foremost, we need to have a common Asean position,” he told CNBC on the eve of the summit. Uh oh. 

Sure, it’s very good to not invite representatives of the junta to take a seat at the table, but this goes deeper: “At the moment, I’m reminded more about the divisions rather than the unity … this is not only a litmus test for Asean, but in my view is an existential threat to Asean.” 

It’s an odd time. We have an elder statesman warning of an existential threat while partner countries won’t make a peep about Asia without first committing to ‘Asean centrality’. What the hell does that mean? If the bloc can’t come out swinging against a recalcitrant member who seized power from its own people and then turned around and spent the last two years airstriking the living hell out of those same people, what can it do? If Asean wants to lean into being an economic bloc largely concerned with deeper integration, great! That’s a reasonable thing to do given its fundamental limitations. But the region and the world would be worse off for it. 

Give Timor-Leste that seat, let’s go.